






















Safe Controller Synthesis with Tunable
Input-to-State Safe Control Barrier Functions
Anil Alan1, Andrew J. Taylor2, Chaozhe R. He1,3, Gábor Orosz1,4, and Aaron D. Ames2
Abstract— To bring complex systems into real world envi-
ronments in a safe manner, they will have to be robust to
uncertainties—both in the environment and the system. This
paper investigates the safety of control systems under input
disturbances, wherein the disturbances can capture uncertain-
ties in the system. Safety, framed as forward invariance of sets
in the state space, is ensured with the framework of control
barrier functions (CBFs). Concretely, the definition of input
to state safety (ISSf) is generalized to allow the synthesis of
non-conservative, tunable controllers that are provably safe
under varying disturbances. This is achieved by formulating
the concept of tunable input to state safe control barrier
functions (TISSf-CBFs) which guarantee safety for disturbances
that vary with state and, therefore, provide less conservative
means of accommodating uncertainty. The theoretical results
are demonstrated with a simple control system with input
disturbance and also applied to design a safe connected cruise
controller for a heavy duty truck.
I. INTRODUCTION
Safety is of the utmost importance for control systems,
often prioritized over other performance requirements. A
formal definition of safety has been proposed via the forward
invariance of sets in the state space. Forward invariance
can be ensured using barrier certificates [1] and barrier
functions [2], [3]. The extension of the latter to control
barrier functions (CBF) provides a tool for control design
by imposing an easy-to-compute condition over a desired
safe set. A recent survey on CBFs can be found in [4], and
alternative methods for safety-critical control in [5], [6].
Among other relevant applications such as multi-agent
systems [7] and robotics [8], automated vehicles stand out as
a natural candidate for safety-critical control. Due to recent
developments of optical sensors and vehicle-to-everything
(V2X) communication modules, many safety hazards in
traffic can be detected. Thus, the goal of control design is
to prevent safety breaches while utilizing sensory and V2X
information. Examples of the use of control barrier functions
include adaptive and connected cruise control [2], [9] and
lane keeping [10] problems. The effectiveness of the safety-
critical control is typically demonstrated using simulations
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that may be transferred to the real world assuming that the
systems model is accurate.
Uncertainties such as unmodeled dynamics and unknown
input disturbances pose risks to guaranteeing safety in the
real-world implementations. Robust CBF methods have been
proposed to address this problem [11], [12], [13]. We focus
on the concept of input-to-state safety (ISSf) first introduced
in [14] and extended in [15]. In this case safety is redefined
as the forward invariance of a larger set. While control design
under an unknown bounded input disturbance is possible
utilizing input to state safety control barrier functions (ISSf-
CBF), this approach lacks flexibility in design and often
yields conservative results.
In this paper we revisit the fundamental definition of ISSf
and ISSf-CBFs and generalize them to enable a tunable con-
trol design. Our main results introduces tunable input to state
safety control barrier function (TISSf-CBF), a generalized
version of ISSf-CBFs, that permit controllers that provide
safety guarantees while reducing conservatism. In particular,
it allows one to reduce the size of the larger invariant set so
that it approximates the safe set of the undisturbed system
without significantly impacting performance. The results of
this theorem are demonstrated using a simple example as
well as the real-world application of a connected cruise
controller for a heavy duty vehicle.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Sec. II provides a
background on safety, control barrier functions (CBF), input-
to-state safety (ISSf) and ISSf-CBFs. In Sec. III, we for-
mulate tunable input-to-state safe control barrier functions
(TISSf-CBF), and provide guarantees on the forward invari-
ance of a set in the presence of disturbances. We demonstrate
the method using a simple illustrative example. In Sec. IV,
we apply the method to connected cruise control design and
demonstrate its performance in a safety-critical scenario. We
conclude our results and lay our future directions in Sec. V.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
This section presents a review of safety and control barrier
functions, followed by the notion of input-to-state safety
in the presence of input disturbances. These theoretical
concepts are illustrated with a simple example.
A. Safety and Control Barrier Functions
We consider a nonlinear control-affine system:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u, (1)
with state x ∈ Rn, input u ∈ Rm, and functions
f : Rn → Rn and g : Rn → Rn×m assumed to be locally
Lipschitz continuous on Rn. Using a locally Lipschitz
continuous state feedback controller k : Rn → Rm, with
u = k(x), yields the closed loop system:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)k(x). (2)
As the functions f , g, and k are locally Lipschitz continuous,
for any initial condition x0 , x(0) ∈ Rn, there exists a
time interval I(x0) = [0, tmax) such that x(t) is the unique
solution to (2) on I(x0); see [16].
We define the notion of safety in this context as forward
invariance of a set in the state space. Specifically, suppose
there exists a set C ⊂ Rn defined as the 0-superlevel set of
a continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R:
C , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) ≥ 0} , (3)
∂C , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) = 0}, (4)
Int(C) , {x ∈ Rn : h(x) > 0}. (5)
The set C is said to be forward invariant if for any initial
condition x0 ∈ C, x(t) ∈ C for all t ∈ I(x0). In this case,
we denote the system (2) is safe with respect to the set C,
and refer to C as the safe set.
A continuous function α : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is said to be
class K∞ (α ∈ K∞) if α is strictly monotonically increas-
ing with α(0) = 0 and limr→∞ α(r) = ∞, and a continu-
ous function α : R → R is said to be extended class K∞
(α ∈ K∞,e) if it belongs to K∞ and limr→−∞ α(r) = −∞.
With these definitions, control barrier functions, as defined
in [17], are presented as a tool for synthesizing controllers
that enforce the safety of C.
Definition 1 (Control Barrier Function (CBF) [17]). Let
C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set of a continuously differen-
tiable function h : Rn → R with ∂h
∂x
(x) 6= 0 when h(x) = 0.
The function h is a control barrier function (CBF) for (1)

















Given a CBF h for (1) and a corresponding α ∈ K∞,e, we






∣ ḣ(x,u) ≥ −α(h(x))
}
. (7)
Theorem 1 ([17]). Let C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set
of a continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R with
∂h
∂x
(x) 6= 0 when h(x) = 0. If h is a CBF for (1) on C, then
any Lipschitz continuous controller with k(x) ∈ KCBF(x)
for all x ∈ C renders (2) safe with respect to the set C.
Example 1. Consider a dynamic system:
ẋ1 = −x2, ẋ2 = u, (8)
with state x ∈ R2 and input u ∈ R, a feedback controller:
k(x) = x1 − 2x2 − 1, (9)
and the CBF candidate:
h(x) = x1 − x2, (10)
that defines the set C as:
C =
{
x ∈ R2 | x1 − x2 ≥ 0
}
. (11)
The evolution of h under (2) is given by:




that is, choosing the extended class K∞ function α(r) = r
yields that k(x) ∈ KCBF(x). We present simulation results
for the closed loop system in Fig. 1(a), where all the tra-
jectories initiated from different initial conditions x(0) ∈ C
safely approach the stable equilibrium point (−1, 0).
B. Input-to-State Safety
Unmodeled effects and disturbances may make it infeasi-
ble for a state feedback controller k(x) to be implemented
exactly. Instead, a potentially time-varying disturbance d :
R≥0 → R
m is added to the controller, such that u =
k(x) + d(t), resulting in the closed loop system:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)k(x) + g(x)d(t). (12)
The safety guarantees endowed by controllers satisfying
k(x) ∈ KCBF(x) may no longer be valid for the disturbed
closed loop system. Thus, we wish to design a safety-critical
controller that ensures safety in the presence of disturbances.
We consider the disturbed control system:
ẋ = f(x) + g(x)u + g(x)d(t), (13)
where the disturbance d is assumed to be bounded, defining
‖d‖∞ = supt≥0 ‖d(t)‖ < ∞. With disturbances, we look
for a larger set Cd that is forward invariant, i.e., C ⊂ Cd
for any ‖d‖∞ > 0. We require Cd to grow monotonically
with ‖d‖∞, and recover the original safe set in the absence
of the disturbance, i.e., Cd ≡ C when ‖d‖∞ = 0. Given these
requirements, define a function hd : Rn × R≥0 → R as:
hd(x, ‖d‖∞) , h(x) + γ(‖d‖∞), (14)
with γ ∈ K∞ and define Cd as its 0-superlevel set:
Cd , {x ∈ R
n : hd(x, ‖d‖∞) ≥ 0} , (15)
∂Cd , {x ∈ R
n : hd(x, ‖d‖∞) = 0}, (16)
Int(Cd) , {x ∈ R
n : hd(x, ‖d‖∞) > 0}. (17)
Definition 2 (Input-to-State Safety). Let C ⊂ Rn be the
0-superlevel set of a continuously differentiable function
h : Rn → R. The system (12) is input-to-state safe (ISSf)
if there exists γ ∈ K∞ such that the set Cd defined by (15)-
(17) is forward invariant. In this case, we refer to the original
set C as an input-to-state safe set (ISSf set).
Given a controller k(x) that ensures the undisturbed
system (2) is safe with respect to the set C for a given
CBF h, i.e., k(x) ∈ KCBF(x), we consider the following
modification:





where ǫ0 ∈ R>0 is a positive constant. Motivated by this
controller, we give the definition of the input-to-state safe
control barrier function:
Definition 3 (Input-to-State Safe Control Barrier Function
(ISSf-CBF)). Let C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set of a contin-
uously differentiable function h : Rn → R with ∂h
∂x
(x) 6= 0
when h(x) = 0. Then h is an input-to-state safe control
barrier function (ISSf-CBF) for (13) on C if there exists
α ∈ K∞,e and ǫ0 > 0 such that for all x ∈ Rn:
sup
u∈Rm






As with CBFs, we may define the point-wise set of control
values satisfying (19):
KISSf(x) , {u ∈ R
m | u satisfies (19) for x} . (20)
Theorem 2. Let C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set of a contin-
uously differentiable function h : Rn → R with ∂h
∂x
(x) 6= 0
when h(x) = 0. If h is an ISSf-CBF for (13) on C, then
for any Lipschitz continuous controller with k(x) ∈ KISSf
for all x ∈ Rn, the system (12) is safe with respect to Cd










where β ∈ K∞ is given by β(r) = −α(−r). Furthermore,
this implies C is an ISSf set.




[Lfh(x) + Lgh(x)(u+ d)] > −α(h(x))− ι(‖d‖∞),
(22)
for some ι ∈ K∞. It also proves that a function satisfying







We use the more specific definition in (19) as it is better
suited for the controller design presented in this letter.
As β−1 ∈ K∞, a smaller ǫ0 implies a smaller value of
γ(‖d‖∞) for a given ‖d‖∞, which reduces the difference
between the sets C and Cd. However, taking ǫ0 to be small
increases the right hand side of (19), and forces a more
restrictive safety condition be met by k. Controllers satis-
fying this more restrictive condition may lead to undesirable
performance as illustrated by the example below.
Example 2. We now introduce a disturbance to the example:
ẋ1 = −x2, ẋ2 = u+ d(t), (24)
where d : R≥0 → R. Fig. 1(b) depicts the simulation results
with the controller k(x) defined in (9) for the harmonic
Fig. 1. The sets C, Cd and Cd,T (shaded) and simulation results
for Examples 1-3. (a) The boundary ∂C (green) and simulated
trajectories with controller (9) without disturbance. (b) Trajectories
with disturbance. (c) The boundary ∂Cd for ǫ0 = 0.1 (gray) and
ǫ0 = 1 (black) and simulation results for controller (25). (d) The
boundary ∂Cd,T (red) and simulation results for controller (44).
disturbance d(t) = d̄ sin t with d̄ = 3. We see that the dis-
turbance makes the state trajectories leave C periodically.
Inspired by (18), we consider the modified controller:
u = k(x) +
Lgh(x)
ǫ0




cf. (9). The evolution of h under (12) is given by:










such that with α(r) = r, h is an ISSf-CBF for (24) on the set





















Figure 1(c) portrays the boundary ∂Cd for ǫ0 = 1 (gray) and
ǫ0 = 0.1 (black). A larger ǫ0 implies a larger gap between the
original set C and the forward invariant set Cd, and as a result,
gives way to the trajectories leaving C. In contrast, a smaller
ǫ0 shifts Cd closer to C, in the case yielding trajectories
that stay in C. This, however, comes with an expense of
substantially effecting the performance as the trajectories are
pushed further inside the set C.
III. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we present the main result of the paper
by introducing a new method for characterizing safety in the
presence of disturbances. It uses a more general definition of
the set Cd to enable synthesis of controllers that can ensure
safety without compromising performance.
The previous specification of hd and γ as in (14) and
(21), respectively, implies that the difference hd(x)− h(x)
is constant for all x ∈ Cd for a given ‖d‖∞. In other words,
requiring a constant ǫ0 imposes strong restrictions on the
structure of hd(x) and Cd. As a result, prioritizing safety
with a smaller ǫ0 may lead to overcompensation by the
controller and may affect the performance in an undesirable
fashion. We wish to find a new set that is still forward
invariant, but allows more flexibility in designing controllers.
To this end, define the function hd,T : Rn × R≥0 → R as:
hd,T(x, ‖d‖∞) = h(x) + γT(h(x), ‖d‖∞), (27)
with γT : R× R≥0 → R≥0 continuously differentiable in its
first argument and γT(a, ·) ∈ K∞ for all a ∈ R. Indeed, hd
defined by (14) is a special case of hd,T defined by (27).
We define Cd,T as the 0-superlevel set of the function hd,T:
Cd,T , {x ∈ R
n : hd,T(x, ‖d‖∞) ≥ 0} , (28)
∂Cd,T , {x ∈ R
n : hd,T(x, ‖d‖∞) = 0}, (29)
Int(Cd,T) , {x ∈ R
n : hd,T(x, ‖d‖∞) > 0}. (30)
Note that C ⊂ Cd,T for ‖d‖∞ > 0. In the absence of distur-
bances (‖d‖∞ = 0) we recover the original set (Cd,T ≡ C)
as hd,T(x, 0) = h(x). Also, Cd,T grows monotonically with
‖d‖∞. Analogous to (18) we propose the controller:





where ǫ : R → R>0 is a continuously differentiable function
and k(x) ∈ KCBF(x). This controller motivates a generaliza-
tion of Definition 3, and a corresponding safety result.
Definition 4 (Tunable Input-to-State Safe Control Barrier
Function (TISSf-CBF)). Let C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set
of a continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R with
∂h
∂x
(x) 6= 0 when h(x) = 0. Then h is a tunable input-to-
state safe control barrier function (TISSf-CBF) for (13) on
C with continuously differentiable function ǫ : R → R>0 if
there exists α ∈ K∞,e such that for all x ∈ Rn:
sup
u∈Rm






As with ISSf-CBFs, we may define the point-wise set of
control values satisfying (32):
KTISSf(x) , {u ∈ R
m | u satisfies (32) for x} . (33)
Theorem 3. Let C ⊂ Rn be the 0-superlevel set of a
continuously differentiable function h : Rn → R. If h is a
TISSf-CBF for (13) on C with continuously differentiable
function ǫ : R → R>0 such that α
−1 ∈ K∞,e is continuously
















then for any Lipschitz continuous controller with
k(x) ∈ KTISSf(x) for all x ∈ R
n, the system (12) is
safe with respect to Cd,T defined as in (28)-(30) with
γT : R× R≥0 defined as:








Proof. Our goal is to show that the set Cd,T defined by (28)-
(30) is forward invariant. For a controller satisfying k(x) ∈
KTISSf(x) for all x ∈ Rn, we have that:







Noting that Lgh(x)d(t) ≥ −‖Lgh(x)‖‖d‖∞ and ǫ(h(x)) >
0 for all x ∈ Rn and t ≥ 0, adding and subtracting
ǫ(h(x))‖d‖2
∞
4 , and completing the squares yields:




Next, taking the time derivative of the function hd,T defined
by (27) yields:













(h(x), ‖d‖∞) > 0. (39)
Substituting (37) into (38), we obtain:












Next, we consider a state x ∈ ∂Cd,T, such that hd,T(x) = 0,






ḣd,T(x, ‖d‖∞, t) ≥ 0. (41)
Additionally, when hd,T(x) = 0, we have α(h(x)) < 0.
Thus, (32) implies ∂h
∂x
















using (39). Therefore, Nagumo’s theorem [18] implies the
set Cd,T is forward invariant as hd,T(x, ‖d‖∞) = 0 implies
ḣd,T(x, ‖d‖∞, t) ≥ 0, and
∂hd,T
∂x
(x, ‖d‖∞) 6= 0.
Example 3. For the disturbed system in Example 2, we pick
the following differentiable function:
ǫ(h(x)) , ǫ0e
λ1h(x)+λ0 , (43)









it can be shown that h as defined in (10) is a TISSf-CBF for


















is forward invariant. We depict the set Cd,T in Fig. 1(d) con-
sidering ǫ0 = 1, λ1 = 2 and λ0 = −2 along with simulation
results. All solution trajectories stay within the set Cd,T that
is close to C, and the overcompensation inside the set C is
prevented as ǫ(h(x)) takes larger values when h(x) ≫ 0.
Remark 2. Rather than utilizing (31) by modifying an exist-
ing safe controller k(x) ∈ KCBF(x), the condition (32) can
be utilized to synthesize an optimization-based controller via











that may intervene less compared to (31).
IV. INPUT-TO-STATE SAFETY FOR AUTOMATED TRUCKS
In this section, we implement previously introduced tun-
able input-to-state safe control barrier functions (TISSf-
CBF) to design the longitudinal controller of a connected
automated truck while responding to the motion of a con-
nected vehicle ahead. We use a simplified model to design
the controller and we demonstrate that the controller can
maintain safety in real-world safety-critical scenario by sim-
ulating a high-fidelity vehicle model.
Consider the simplified model for the system:
Ḋ = vL − v, v̇ = u+ d(t), v̇L = aL, (46)
where D denotes the bumper-to-bumper headway distance
between the truck and the vehicle ahead, v is the longitudinal
velocity of the truck, while vL and aL are longitudinal
velocity and acceleration of the preceding vehicle. The state
is defined by x = [D, v, vL] ∈ R3 while u denotes the input.
The input disturbance d(t) represents the unmodelled dynam-
ics, i.e., rolling resistance, air drag, powertrain dynamics and
delays related to sensing, computation and communication.
We remark that while the distance D and the velocities v, vL
can be measured by sensors, to obtain the acceleration signal
aL V2X communication is needed [9]. That is why we refer
to the controller below as connected cruise control rather
than adaptive cruise control. Finally, to incorporate physical
limitations we prescribe bounds for the input and the states:
u ∈ [−a, a], aL ∈ [−aL, aL], v, vL ∈ [0, v], (47)
where a = 6 [m/s2], a = 2 [m/s2], aL = 10 [m/s
2],
aL = 3 [m/s
2] and v = 20 [m/s] are considered.
In order to ensure safety the truck need to keep a safe
distance from the preceding vehicle which may depend on
the velocities. This leads to the safety function candidate
h(x) = D − ĥ(v, vL), (48)
where we use
ĥ(v, vL) = Dsf + θv + ηvL + ξv
2 + ζvvL + ωv
2
L. (49)
The parameters Dsf = 2 [m], θ = 1.1 [s], η = 0.6 [s], and
ξ = −ζ = −ω = 0.03 [s2/m] are chosen such that the truck
is kept beyond a critical time headway of 1 second while
considering the physical bounds (47). It can be shown that
for (48)-(49) we have ∂h
∂x
6= 0 when h(x) = 0.






∣ D − ĥ(v, vL) ≥ 0
}
, (50)
and to render it safe, we utilize a feedback controller
k(x) = k1(V (D)− v) + k2(vL − v), (51)
where k1, k2 ∈ R are the controller parameters. The first term





0 if D < Dst,
κ(D −Dst) if Dst ≤ D ≤ v/κ+Dst,
v if D > v/κ+Dst,
(52)
where Dst ∈ R>0 is the desired stopping distance and
1/κ ∈ R>0 defines the desired time headway. The sec-
ond term in (51) specifies the speed related error. Con-
sidering α(r) = r one may show that the parameters
k1 = 0.7 [1/s], k2 = 0.75 [1/s], κ = 0.7 [1/s], Dst = 7 [m]
yield k(x) ∈ KCBF; see [9].
In order to incorporate real-worlds disturbances, numerical
simulations are carried out using a high fidelity model
of a ProStar+ in-production tractor built in TruckSim and
Simulink. Pre-recorded experimental data is used to represent
the preceding vehicle’s speed vL and acceleration aL; see
Fig. 2(b),(d). In particular, the recorded data correspond
to an emergency braking scenario in city traffic where the
preceding vehicle decelerates from 15 [m/s] to a full stop
with acceleration reaching −8 [m/s2]. The simulation results
are presented in Fig. 2 as blue curves. While the truck avoids
the crash, it is unable to maintain safety (h becomes negative
in panel (c)) as the controller (51) is designed using the
model (46) with no disturbance (d = 0).
Next we modify the controller (51) as










h is an ISSf-CBF for any ǫ0 ∈ R>0, according to Theorem 2,
Fig. 2. High-fidelity simulation results showing (a) distance, (b)
velocities, (c) the function h defined by (48), and (d) input u.
Simulations are carried out with the CBF controller (51) (blue),
the ISSf-CBF controller (53) for ǫ0 = 1.5 (black) and ǫ0 = 2.5
















is forward invariant. The corresponding simulations are
shown in Fig. 2 by black and gray curves for two different
values of ǫ0 as indicated. Panel (c) shows that the system
leaves the original set C for ǫ0 = 2.5 (gray) as indicated by
h < 0. Choosing ǫ0 = 1.5 (black) ensures that h > 0, it
substantially affects the performance by making the truck to
keep larger distances even when traveling with a constant
speed (which would likely invite other vehicles to cut in).
Finally, we consider the TISSf-CBF setting and modify
the controller (51) as








with ǫ(h(x) as defined in (43); cf. (31). It can be verified
that any parameter combination ǫ0, λ1 ∈ R>0 and λ0 ∈ R
















is forward invariant. The corresponding simulation results
are shown in Fig. 2 as red curves for parameters ǫ0 = 1 [m],
λ1 = 0.5 [1/m] and λ0 = −5. It can be observed that the
system stays within the original set C without leaving a large
distance headway at a steady state speed.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we first reviewed the notion of safety and
input-to-state safety formulated by input-to-state safe control
barrier functions (ISSf-CBF), and provided the conditions
for the forward invariance of a set under input disturbance.
We then presented the new tunable input-to-state safe control
barrier functions (TISSf-CBF) to remedy the lack of tunabil-
ity of the previous setup. In the final part, we demonstrated
the effectiveness of the new method in simulation environ-
ment with a high fidelity automated truck model. Future work
will include implementing a safety-critical control based on
TISSf-CBF to a real automated truck and ensuring the safety
experimentally.
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